Here comes trouble

In the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, Azar Gat writes:

Today's global liberal democratic order faces two challenges. The first is radical Islam -- and it is the lesser of the two challenges...The second, and more significant, challenge emanates from the rise of nondemocratic great powers: the West's old Cold War rivals China and Russia, now operating under authoritarian capitalist, rather than communist, regimes. Authoritarian capitalist great powers played a leading role in the international system up until 1945. They have been absent since then. But today, they seem poised for a comeback...

Authoritarian capitalist states, today exemplified by China and Russia, may represent a viable alternative path to modernity, which in turn suggests that there is nothing inevitable about liberal democracy's ultimate victory -- or future dominance.

Gat points out that there was nothing inevitable about the rise of democracy in the 20th century. Some proponents of an "end of history" theory argue that democracy has inherent strengths that will lead it to ultimate victory; others believe that economically successful nations will eventually turn to democracy. But Gat argues that it wasn't either of these factors that allowed democracy to beat fascism and communism - it was the lucky fact that the U.S. just happened to be a democracy. He writes:

Throughout the twentieth century, the United States' power consistently surpassed that of the next two strongest states combined, and this decisively tilted the global balance of power in favor of whichever side Washington was on. If any factor gave the liberal democracies their edge, it was above all the existence of the United States rather than any inherent advantage. In fact, had it not been for the United States, liberal democracy may well have lost the great struggles of the twentieth century.

The U.S. just happened to be the biggest and the most capitalist society around last century. But now, with China already much bigger than us and (probably) about to reach a much higher level of total GDP, the "big dog" just might be on the authoritarian side this time around. And that should be a scary thought.

But will China (and its new sheriff, Russia) democratize once its middle class expands and becomes wealthier? Gat isn't convinced:

All that can be said at the moment is that there is nothing in the historical record to suggest that a transition to democracy by today's authoritarian capitalist powers is inevitable, whereas there is a great deal to suggest that such powers have far greater economic and military potential than their communist predecessors did.

I second this skepticism. As James Mann recently pointed out in his book The China Fantasy, precisely zero of our rosy predictions about growth leading to Chinese liberalization have come true.

In other words, if you believe that liberal democracy is good in its own right - not just as a means to wealth or peace - then you had better hope that the strong countries happen to be democratic ones this century. Gat claims that the U.S. (in alliance with Europe) is still the last, best hope for democracy, but he sneaks in this little caveat:

If China and Russia do not become democratic, it will be critical that India remain so, both because of its vital role in balancing China and because of the model that it represents for other developing countries.

And now you know why I support the U.S.-India nuclear deal, despite fears that it will encourage nuclear proliferation. I want India to become a nuclear power equal to China or the U.K. or France - yes, that means building more nukes - and I want India to be the recipient of cutting-edge U.S. technologies, even if that doesn't directly pay off for America in the short run, even if that gives cover for Iran to expand its nuclear program. Because I agree with Azar Gat that democracy got really lucky in the 20th century, and I want it to get lucky in the 21st.